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Executive Summary  
Introduction 
1. Futurebuilders arose out of the 2002 Treasury Cross-Cutting Review of the Role of 
the Voluntary and Community Sector in Service Delivery.  It is an innovative policy 
designed to support the third sector through venture capital style funding.  It 
predominantly offers loans to the sector.  The Government committed up to £215 
million to the fund.  The Cross-Cutting Review emphasised Futurebuilders' role 
in increasing the capacity of the Third Sector to deliver public services, and the 
sector’s relative strengths in terms of specialist knowledge, expertise to reach hard-
to-reach groups, bring innovation to services and the improvement of service 
outcomes.  
 
2. Futurebuilders is seen as a policy experiment. As such it is an opportunity for 
Government to test how the third sector can be supported using loan funding to build 
its capacity to deliver public services and achieve social outcomes. A role which has 
been broadly defined as social investment.  
 
3. Futurebuilders is managed under contract to Government by a Fund Manager 
(Futurebuilders England Ltd or FBE). There have been two separate Fund Managers. 
From June 2004 to March 2008 (FBE 1) and from April 2008 to March 2011 (with an 
option to extend for a further three years (FBE 2). As part of the re-tendering 
exercise which led to FBE 2, the Office of the Third Sector introduced into the 
contract with the Fund Manager a set of Key Performance Indicators.  
 
4. The aim of this report is to provide an assessment of Futurebuilders, guided by the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Futurebuilders increases the capacity of the voluntary and community sector 
to deliver public services.  
(from original Evaluation Specification, Home Office 2005).  
 
5. This is the final report of the evaluation of Futurebuilders. It considers the following: 
 
 the rationale for Futurebuilders and the evaluation framework (Chapter 2) 
 the evolution of Futurebuilders, and in particular the processes set up by the 
Fund Manager to deliver the fund, a profile of applications and investments, and 
the effectiveness of Key Performance Indicators (Chapter 3) 
 the outcomes from Futurebuilders in terms of organisational development for 
third sector investee organisations (Chapter 4), procurement and public 
service delivery (Chapter 5), and social outcomes (Chapter 6) 
 impact and value for money of Futurebuilders (Chapter 7) 
 a conclusion assessing Futurebuilders providing lessons for social investment 
policy (Chapter 8). 
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The Rationale for Futurebuilders and Approach to its Evaluation 
6. The design of Futurebuilders can be best understood by understanding its rationale 
or ‘theory of change’ under three main evaluation streams, shown below. 
  
Figure 1: Futurebuilders Evaluation Strands and Logic Chain 
 
7. In addition to this there are a series of key assumptions and hypotheses which 
underpin the Futurebuilders policy: 
 
 Targeting: that the third sector is better placed (than public or private sectors) 
to deliver public services, especially around work with hard-to-reach 
groups 
 Overcomes a Market Failure: that third sector organisations are unable to 
sufficiently access investment markets, despite having fundable 
investments (i.e. there is some form(s) of market failure)  
 Engaged and Patient Funding: that the use of loan funding through an 
engaged investor approach, more than other funding approaches (i.e. grants 
and commercial loans), allows the third sector to expand capacity to deliver 
public services 
 Funds can be Recycled and reinvested by Government.   
 
8. Furthermore, Futurebuilders also differs from other social investors (some 
government, some third sector backed). In brief, key differences between 
Futurebuilders and the other social investors include: 
 
 it is the largest social investment fund in England. This, in theory, allows it 
to benefit from economies of scale and to have a higher profile. it also 
potentially allows it to have a more diverse portfolio of investments, by types of 
investment, organisations supported and levels of risk accepted  
 its focus is explicitly on public service delivery 
 it assumes at the outset that surpluses generated on contract income will 
be used to repay the loan (i.e. investees do not use fundraising, grant income 
or even reserves) 
 applicants for funding are appraised on both their demonstration of social 
and financial returns. 
 
9. The evaluation of Futurebuilders commenced in July 2005.  Following a scoping 
phase between July and October 2005, the ‘main phase’ of the evaluation ran from 
late 2005 through to February 2010. A formative interim evaluation report was 
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published in April 2008. This final report represents the culmination of several 
strands of research to provide a summative assessment of the impact of 
Futurebuilders. 
 
 
Evolution of Futurebuilders 
10. At the end of January 2010 a total of 375 organisations had agreed investments 
worth a total of £154.7m of which the total value of loan investment was 
£126.5m (data from FBE, end January 2010).The distribution of funds according to 
funding type is summarised in the table below. 
 
Table: Overview of the distribution of Futurebuilders Funds 
 
 
Total (£m) Number Average 
(£,000s) 
Finance based:    
Loan £126 250 £506 
Guarantee £2 23 £95 
Sub-total £128 273 £471 
Grant based:    
Development Grant £3 132 £24 
Capital Grant £15 141 £108 
Revenue Grant £6 96 £61 
Capacity Building £2 107 £16 
Sub-total £26 476 £55 
Write-offs/Full Provisions £3 15 £203 
Total Investment Funds £155 375 £413 
Source: FBE (February 2010) 
 
11. Since its inception in 2004 Futurebuilders has evolved considerably. During this 
time the fund has undergone major changes both internally (in terms of the 
processes linked to funding application and portfolio management) and externally (in 
terms of governance and management by government). However, its focus remains 
on investing in organisations which would not have access to commercial funding. 
 
12. Whereas FBE 1 offered development grants and full investments (loans which may 
include a grant element), FBE 2 has introduced a series of investment products 
(such as a Tender Fund and Consortia Fund) 
 
13. In terms of applications made to and investments made by Futurebuilders the 
following patterns stand out: 
 
 three public service delivery areas account for 82 per cent of applications 
and 84 per cent of investments (Health and Social Care, Children and Young 
People and Education and Learning) 
 a rise in the demand for smaller amounts of funding (for less than £100 
thousand in FBE 2) and a rise in applications from small (less that £100 
thousand turnover) organisations. It was also notable that applications for less 
than £100 thousand were more likely to be successful in FBE 2 
 a fall in the number of applications going to detailed application stage 
(requiring a business plan) from 509 in FBE 1 to 236 FBE 2 (up to January 
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2010). At the same time the conversion rate (of applications to 
investments) has increased from 24 percent to 40 percent.  
 
14. Overall the evaluation finds that: 
 
 the change in Fund Manager in 2008 and introduction of Key Performance 
Indicators has led to streamlined processes, clearer marketing and more 
tailored support packages (for instance the introduction of specific 
investment products)  
 the Key Performance Indicators are better aligned to the policy objectives 
of Futurebuilders and have contributed to faster delivery of the funding. 
 
15. The average time from agreement to invest to the first drawdown of funding is 
315 days with this having fallen from 448 days (FBE 1) to 125 days (FBE 2). 
This is a significant shift and is reflected in shifts from physical capital to working 
capital investments and falls in the average size of investments (from £358 thousand 
under FBE 1 to £307 thousand under FBE 2). It also reflects a change in the 
processes used by the Fund Manager. Moreover, the average payback period of 
loans, has fallen from 14 years for FBE 1 investments to 10.8 years for FBE 2 
investments. These terms are agreed through negotiation between the Fund 
Manager and investee 
 
16. The reduction in time for fund dispersal brings forward the time taken to put in 
place the capacity to secure Public Service contracts (from over one year to 
just over four months). For example, loans tend to be drawn on physical capital 
projects on the completion of each phase of a building.  
 
 
Understanding the Outcomes of Futurebuilders 
17. Of £215 million originally allocated by government to Futurebuilders, funds 
committed to loans are £155 million (at end January 2010 when the fund was 
fully committed). As at the end of January 2010 £91.4 million had been disbursed. 
Although the rate of disbursement has greatly increased, the assessment of 
outcomes achieved (assessed up to September 2009) is made largely on this 
basis with some analysis of likely future impacts.  
 
18. A key message which comes through from programmes such as 
Futurebuilders is that the intermediate outcomes are largely defined in terms 
of organisational development and public service delivery with (final) social 
outcomes occurring in the longer term. There is however a noticeable time lag 
between each stage of the Futurebuilders logic chain. These help inform the extent 
to which impacts have been achieved to date and the extent to which impacts still 
need to be forecast.  
 
19. Social outcomes for service users will follow Public Service Delivery. In some cases 
these may be quite short term (for instance the delivery of a neighbourhood 
mediation service) but in other cases will take far longer to realise (for instance 
the provision of specialist education to children with a limiting lifelong 
condition). In the latter example, full outcomes may not be realised until adulthood. 
However, as part of these there maybe more immediate benefits (e.g. better 
management of a health condition).  
 
20. Outcomes and impact from Futurebuilders therefore need to be considered 
over differing time periods, for organisations, public service users and for service 
users.  
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Organisational Development Outcomes 
21. Organisational development is an important outcome area for Futurebuilders and 
both Fund Managers were found to be identifying the necessary support 
organisations required. However, the level of capacity building required varied 
considerably across the investee organisations and there was no guarantee in 
cases which were at risk that the support would be sufficient for investment 
success.  
 
22. The main findings from this section of the report show that: 
 
 FBE has been effective at selecting strong organisations and that 
organisations perform well (in terms of their income growth) compared to 
‘comparator organisations’ from the wider sector 
 the case studies showed that FBE tends to invest in two broad types of 
organisations, those which have already built capacity but are seeking to 
grow further and those which still require organisational development 
support 
 FBE appears effective in identifying those organisations with further 
development needs and targeting support accordingly. Furthermore, FBE’s 
monitoring systems and processes appear appropriate in terms of identifying 
organisations which may be vulnerable or at risk during the course of an 
investment 
 however, organisations with further development needs are more 
vulnerable and FBE support (combining support and grants in some 
cases) is not a guarantee of investment success.  
 
23. The evaluation found that investment selection and organisational development 
needs to consider a combination of internal organisational management and external 
relationship factors. Of these, external relations with funders and financial 
management are particularly important.  
 
24. We found that managing loan investments placed new pressures on organisations, 
not just in the narrow accounting for these loans (which we found had improved over 
time) but in the strategic shift organisations needed to make in relation to income 
generation and the delivery of public service contracts. 
 
 
Public Service Delivery and Procurement 
25. What is a significant driver or barrier for the realisation of FBE investments at 
the case level, are the policy environments and procurement markets in which 
organisations operate. The following appear common features of more favourable 
procurement markets for FBE investee organisations: 
 
 services offered are central to mainstream policy agendas and public 
agency budgets  
 services are aligned with local agencies' priorities, strategies and service 
provision requirements (for example, the services provided will contribute to a 
Local Area Agreement target) 
 demand for services outstrips (local) supply 
 there exist established two-way relations between commissioners 
investee case organisations often spanning local and national levels 
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26. Against this backdrop there are particular challenges around the crime and 
community cohesion public service delivery themes - either because available 
budgets are small (community cohesion) or there has been some uncertainty in the 
procurement opportunities for third sector organisations (crime). On the whole, this 
was not the case in the other areas of public service delivery.  
 
27. Organisational development and capacity is ever changing and not static.  We 
have seen that the capacity to deliver public services that has been built within 
organisations may possibly be reduced if the procurement markets in which they 
operate do not become more favourable in the short to medium term.  Conversely, 
we also found organisations that have not built capacity due to crisis have the 
potential to do so in future. 
 
28. The calculation of net public cost provides a useful indication of the extent to public 
service delivery contracts won by investee organisations represent a net 
saving to the public sector purchaser. Of six case studies presented, investment 
related activity for five organisations was found to result in net savings to the public 
purse of between £600 thousand and £5 million after ten years.  
 
29. However, increased costs do not necessarily equate to an overall negative 
outcome.  It is simply an indication that the new services created through the 
investment activity represent a net cost compared to alternative provision and does 
not take into account of equity benefits which my occur as a result of the investment. 
 
 
Social Outcomes 
30. The direct outcomes from Futurebuilders lie primarily in terms of organisational 
development and in the delivery of public services. Social outcomes, for service 
users are indirect, being purchased by public sector organisations or by individuals 
(in the case of childcare provision and elder care). As such Futurebuilders 
investments may have catalytic effects and may bring benefits which would 
otherwise have not occurred, or not occurred to the same extent. 
 
31. Difficulties in identifying and attributing outcomes were also compounded because: 
 
 Futurebuilders investments may be made alongside other investment and grant 
funding 
 outcomes may extend into the long term (e.g. in the case of childcare 
interventions) 
 outcomes are difficult to attribute solely to one organisation (e.g. a complex 
intervention for the treatment of drug addiction which works across agencies). 
32. We found variable practice in the capture and monitoring of service benefits 
for users. This ranged from organisations which had exemplary monitoring systems 
and extensive research programmes into the outcomes of supported individuals, to 
far more limited monitoring and evaluation systems. In part this reflects the scale and 
scope of the organisations concerned. However, it did raise concerns around how 
social benefits were evidenced at the investment stage. 
 
33. At this stage a comprehensive assessment of the social returns resulting from 
the Futurebuilders programme has not been possible. This is due to the current 
evidence limitations and that many of the investment activities have not progressed 
far enough for outcomes for service users to have been realised. Nevertheless it has 
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been possible to project the potential social returns in a number of cases which 
demonstrate the potential for larger returns in the future. 
 
 
Impact and Value for Money 
34. The impact and value for money from Futurebuilders is assessed as follows: 
 
 in terms of cost efficiency, FBE is broadly comparable to other social 
investment organisations. Indeed its management costs as a proportion of 
the loan book appear lower than comparable government backed social 
investment organisations. This may in part be due benefits from scale but also 
the market which Futurebuilders targets – it is typically working with established 
and not start-up organisations  
 the combined total costs incurred as a result of application and 
investment are broadly similar between social investors. However, it was 
notable that investee costs are lower in successful organisations, but those 
requiring additional support, such as those on cause for concern, incur higher 
costs 
 Futurebuilders appears to be effective in making investments in strong 
organisations (relative to other applicants and similar organisations in 
the sector). Clearly, Futurebuilders can only invest in organisations which 
apply for funding but the findings suggest, at least at the point of investment, 
that on narrow financial criteria that it makes effective decisions 
 investments were found to be largely additional. That is, the investee 
organisations would not have secured investment funding at the same scale 
and at the same time from commercial sources. Some investees noted that 
they may have secured funding but this would have been over a long time 
period, through for instance fund raising activities or from reserves 
 investee organisations were found not to be displacing existing services. 
Service capacity was found overwhelmingly to be additional to existing 
provision, in terms of providing better quality of services, or meeting unmet 
needs and in one case providing a more comprehensive package of support 
and this was at a lower cost per service user (e.g. around supported 
volunteering instead or more passive support in a day care centre)  
 the outcomes experienced by beneficiaries were found to be additional - 
either because beneficiaries were currently not receiving a service (i.e. wholly 
additional) or as was more likely they were provided with a better service. 
 
35. At this stage of Futurebuilders the rate of loan default is low (3.3 percent of full 
investments). This suggests that there is considerable potential for recycling the fund.  
However, the evaluation highlights Futurebuilders investments have been made in a 
largely buoyant period of public expenditure: a more constrained environment will put 
greater pressure on investee organisations and also may prompt further engaged 
and patient funding support from the Fund Manger.  
 
36. Futurebuilders focus is on (commercially) unbankable investments. The 
organisations most appropriate for more straightforward Futurebuilders loan funding 
are those with a viable strategy for securing and delivering Public Service Delivery 
contracts.  Alongside this there were also organisations which required a more 
patient approach, and a combination of loan funding with a higher proportion of grant 
(up to 30 per cent of the total investment) and greater advice. The financial and 
social returns to this class of investment were longer term and risks were greater. 
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Conclusion 
37. It was found that Futurebuilders builds the capacity of the third sector to 
deliver public services. However, there is considerable variation across the 
investment book of the Fund Manager in terms of the extent to which this was 
achieved.  
 
38. Local procurement markets played an important part in shaping the success of 
investments. These factors could not always be anticipated at the outset of an 
investment. However, where investees had high level commitments to provide 
services or a strategic commitment to a particular procurement approach or policy 
area, then it was found to be more likely to be successful.  
 
39. The design of Futurebuilders, notably through the KPIs, focuses the Fund 
Manager on investments which are most likely to secure Public Service 
Delivery contracts. This is an important element of Government supporting social 
investment. 
 
40. There were found to be limitations in the assessment and monitoring of social 
outcomes. There is scope to develop a model of social investment which focuses 
more on social outcomes and understanding the often long timescale over which 
they are achieved. 
 
 
Lessons for Social Investment Policy 
41. The following lessons can be drawn from the evaluation for social investment policy: 
 
Fund Management 
 
42. Investment selection needs to consider factors such as organisational capacity 
(including financial management), the quality of the service being provided, the 
demand for services and the relationship of the investee organisation with funders. 
 
43. Patient and Engaged Funding. A role of social investment in the third sector was 
found to be identifying areas of greatest need and providing appropriate support. 
This could involve supporting organisations through periods of change, growth and 
crisis. 
 
44. Breadth of Investment Portfolio. Futurebuilders demonstrates that it is possible to 
manage a diverse investment portfolio, operating in different public service areas, 
different localities and regions, and with different organisation and investment sizes. 
 
45. Fund recycling. Social investment based on loan funding has the potential for funds 
to be recycled (capital repayments and interest payments). There is scope for 
greater understanding of the management of risk in this process and investment in 
areas of greatest social return. The main risks to fund recycling are around levels of 
public expenditure across areas of service delivery but also local commitments to 
procure services from the third sector. 
 
Organisational Development and Procurement 
 
46. Third Sector Organisational Development. Social investment is not a replacement 
for grant funding and it places different demands on third sector organisations. These 
demands include issues of governance, financial management, marketing, user 
involvement and the management of risk - all of which can be positive to the investee 
organisation but need to be considered at the outset. 
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47. Financial Management. Loan funding - for both working capital and physical capital 
investments - raises a wide range of financial management issues for organisations, 
but which may also drive change in organisations. Key issues were found to be 
around the management of VAT (especially for physical capital investments), the 
pricing of services and cost management, and the impact of working capital 
investments on the balance sheet. 
 
48. Procurement Markets. The procurement markets in which applicant organisations 
operate need to be carefully assessed in the investment process, in terms of the 
opportunities for third sector organisations generally but also the relationship the 
applicant has with funders (current and prospective). 
 
Outcomes 
 
49. Organisational Development and Public Service Delivery Outcomes: building 
organisational capacity is an important outcome but not an end in itself - it needs to 
lead to an increase in contracts secured.  
 
50. Social Outcomes. Futurebuilders was found to be effective in investing in service 
capacity which had the potential to bring social outcomes in the future. However, the 
full social returns to investments are often realised in the long term.  
 
51. Assessment, Monitoring and Measurement of Social Returns. Futurebuilders 
was found to be effective in selecting (financially) strong organisations and 
monitoring financial performance. Investment for social returns, the heart of social 
investment, requires the consistent monitoring and measurement of social returns. 
 
Impact 
 
52. Investing in Service Improvement.  A key focus for Government funded social 
investment is around the support of organisations which provide services which 
address currently unmet needs amongst vulnerable groups.  
 
53. Value for Money. The recycling of funding provides considerable opportunities for 
social investment to provide value for money for Government. However, it is 
contingent on the Fund objectives being combined with long term commitments to 
support the third sector's role different areas of public service delivery.  
 
Social Investment Policy  
 
54. Setting up Social Investment Programmes. Attention in the setting up of social 
investment programmes needs to be given to the market for the initiative (including 
the stimulation of demand) and the necessary competences of the fund manager. 
The current Fund Management arrangements appear appropriate in this respect. 
 
55. Long term commitment by Government. Loan programmes, especially in physical 
capital (typically buildings) can involves a long term commitment by Government until 
loans are repaid. 
 
56. Key Elements of Social Investment were found to include the effective targeting of 
funding to achieve policy objectives (the selection of investments), the provision of 
an engaged or patient approach to funding, and the use of loan funding (to recycle 
funds and to engender a behavioural change in investee organisations). 
